It takes two to tango: Decision-making processes on asset return by Baez-Camargo, Claudia et al.
WO RK I N G PA PER 
SER I ES 24
Claudia Baez-Camargo
Gretta Fenner
Saba Kassa 
It takes two to tango
Decision-making processes on asset return
© Basel Institute on Governance, October 2017
Responsibility for the views expressed and for any errors of fact or judgment rests with the author alone.
Ms Gretta Fenner, Basel Institute on Governance, Steinenring 60, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
gretta.fenner@baselgovernance.org 
Dr Claudia Baez-Camargo, University of Basel, Basel Institute on Governance, Steinenring 60, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
claudia.baez-camargo@baselgovernance.org
Dr Saba Kassa, Basel Institute on Governance, Steinenring 60, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
saba.kassa@baselgovernance.org
Acknowledgements:
Funding for this research provided by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs is gratefully acknowledged.
Claudia Baez-Camargo
Gretta Fenner
Saba Kassa
It takes two to tango
Decision-making processes on asset return

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  7
1.  INTRODUCTION   9
2.  D IALOGUE ON ASSET RETURN AND END-USE 10
2.1 When and how to initiate a dialogue  10
2.2 Who to engage in a dialogue   10
2.3 Why engage in a dialogue   11
2.4 Key takeaways   12
3.  SAFEGUARDING SOVEREIGNTY 13
3.1 Safeguarding the sovereignty of the requesting state  13
3.2 Balancing sovereignty of the requesting and requested states   13
3.3 Key takeaways   15
4.  DECIS IONS ON END-USE 16
4.1 Considerations informing the end-use of returned assets   16
4.2 What modalities for managing and protecting returned assets?   16
4.3 Key takeaways   18
5.  OUTCOMES OF RETURNING STOLEN ASSETS 19
5.1 Returning assets for the benefit of requesting governments and their citizens   19
5.2 Key takeaways   21
6.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR A GUIDANCE ON ASSET RETURN 22
6.1 Functionality of further guidance   22
6.2 Parameters for further guidance   22
REFERENCES 24 
ANNEX I  & I I  24 
Table of contents
5
It takes two to tango - Decision-making processes on asset return
B A S E L I N S T I T U T E O N G O V E R N A N C E
Working paper series No. 24
 

7It takes two to tango - Decision-making processes on asset return
B A S E L I N S T I T U T E O N G O V E R N A N C E
Working paper series No. 24
 
This working paper presents findings from a research project 
that sought to better understand decision-making processes 
on the return of illegally obtained assets using the examples 
of past cases of returning assets that had been stolen from 
Kazakhstan, Peru and the Philippines. While previous papers 
on the subject of returning stolen assets and end-use of 
returned assets were based on third party and desk research, 
the research feeding into this working paper is based on first-
hand accounts collected through semi-structured interviews 
with key decision makers involved in these cases in the 
concerned states (see Annexes I and II for methodology 
and interview questionnaire). A preliminary analysis of these 
interviews and subsequently a draft version of this report 
were presented for discussion and validation during two 
separate expert workshops, in December 2016 in Bern, 
Switzerland, and February 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
respectively.
The key objective of the research was to better understand 
the motivations, considerations and processes that led to 
the decisions on how and for what purpose to use returned 
assets. In this context, the report in particular looks at a 
question often debated in asset recovery circles, namely 
whether there may be a power imbalance between requesting 
and requested states in these processes despite the fact 
that requesting states are legally empowered through the 
UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The potential 
existence of such a power imbalance has in the past often 
given rise to concern, as it is perceived to potentially 
compromise the fundamental principles of asset return of 
UNCAC and the sovereignty of the concerned states. 
In a nutshell, the research summarised in this report found 
that that while power imbalances have been observed, 
though to varying degrees depending on the case and the 
combination of concerned states, this has in practice not 
negatively affected the actual asset return process in the 
analysed cases. The research has also found that such 
imbalances are by no means always one-sided or negatively 
tilted toward the requesting state. More important seems 
to be the existence of a shared interest among concerned 
states, which was usually found in the fundamental objectives 
of returning assets swiftly and invest them in such a way 
that a matter of public interest is advanced. In this regard, 
from the perspective of the requesting states, recovering 
the funds and defining an end-use that either redresses the 
victims, addresses the root causes of the original crime, or 
contributes in another meaningful way to social and economic 
development in the country, was understood to send a strong 
message of commitment by the government to the public 
good and to the fight against impunity for corruption. From 
the perspective of the requested states, returning these 
funds is typically considered important as harbouring illicit 
money is a threat to their financial systems and contributes 
to international financial crime with its wide ranging negative 
impacts on the global economy and development. As such, 
the concerned parties typically share an interest in returning 
stolen assets and in preventing renewed use of these funds 
for illegal purposes. Thus, the idea of concerned states jointly 
discussing the modalities for returning stolen funds and their 
end-use may give rise for concern about potential power 
imbalances, a demonstrated pursuit of the same outcomes 
has in practice helped overcome these concerns. 
Succeeding in this move away from concerns about power 
imbalance to a discussion of shared objectives would however, 
as our research has shown, depend on a host of practical 
considerations and the willingness of all concerned states to 
enter into a constructive dialogue that takes into account the 
perspectives of requesting and requested states. Deserving 
equal attention are the substantive issues that arise when 
it comes to defining the precise modality of asset return. 
Although it seemed to have been comparatively easy to come 
to identify a purpose for which returned assets should be 
used that is in line with the shared objectives in returning 
stolen assets, challenges seemed to arise in the process of 
identifying and developing the precise modalities through 
which this purpose is effectively achieved. In addition, the 
research demonstrates that context matters greatly and 
that another critical element is the careful consideration not 
only of the purpose toward which returned assets should 
contribute and the related implementation mechanism, but 
also the potential need for associated policy and monitoring 
instruments. Adequate deliberation about the technical 
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aspects that will govern the transfer and use of recovered 
funds helps to build trust and enhance cooperation.
In view of the findings of this report summarised in the 
above paragraphs, it is suggested that developing guidance 
for the dialogue between concerned states in the context 
of returning stolen assets may be a key to depoliticise the 
nature of the engagement, support all concerned parties 
in the process, help manage expectations and facilitate an 
alignment of the actors involved around a common vision. 
Such guidance may act as neutral mediation tools in support 
of building up the cooperation of all stakeholders towards 
the successful return of assets, providing a framework for 
dialogue that builds trust without undermining sovereignty, 
legal rights and obligations of any of the parties and offering 
actionable insights on the way the process is best managed 
and implemented.
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1. Introduction
Decision-making processes for the return of stolen assets 
engage with one of the more normative dimensions of asset 
recovery. The United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) establishes that illegally obtained assets should 
be returned to its original legitimate owners. Although this 
is the core principle of the Convention, it subsequently pro-
vides only general guidance on how the return and end-use 
of such assets may be done: In Article 57.5. UNCAC pro-
vides that state parties – where appropriate - could consider 
concluding agreements regarding the final disposal of the 
assets (UNODC, 2004: 48). While the Convention engages 
with the legal and technical context of asset recovery and 
creates an opening for different structures of engagement 
between state parties, the practice informs that these pro-
cesses also have clear political dimensions. The political 
dimensions often revolve around the normative aspects of 
sovereignty, underscoring the particularly delicate nature 
of dialogues between state parties when it comes to finan-
cial matters and questions of responsibility for internation-
al financial crime. So far, these political sensitivities have 
made attempts to generate a commonly accepted guidance, 
guidelines or standards for returning and using returned 
stolen assets difficult.
Considering the aforementioned - and inspired by the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda, which encourages the development of 
good practices on asset return - this report seeks to make a 
contribution to this topic by analysing the decision-making 
processes that led to the return of stolen assets in cases 
involving Kazakhstan, Peru and the Philippines (on the side 
of the so-called “requesting states”), and the concerned 
states from where the assets were to be returned (“request-
ed states”). The arguments made in this report are substan-
tiated by research involving interviews with key actors who 
were personally involved in the negotiations. Attempts to 
also include in the study the experience of Nigeria in relation 
to returned assets stolen by former President Sani Abacha 
unfortunately failed due to difficulties in receiving inputs 
from concerned parties. Prior to finalising this report, the 
underlying research findings have been presented to and 
discussed with expert audiences at two occasions, including 
at the Swiss Public International Law Day in December 2016, 
and at an international expert workshop on asset manage-
ment and return, in February 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Primarily, the report aims to further the understanding on 
the considerations taken into account by requesting and re-
quested states to engage in a dialogue to define the precise 
terms for the return and end-use of illegally obtained assets 
(Chapter 2), and related questions around the critical issue 
of sovereignty in these dialogues (Chapter 3). Additionally, 
the report identifies issues to be considered in determining, 
ideally in a dialogue between concerned states, the modali-
ties of end-use of and safeguarding stolen assets (Chapter 4). 
It also discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the outcomes of the different return modalities and end-us-
es adopted in the cases studied seen from the perspective 
of the interviewees (Chapter 5). On the basis of this infor-
mation, the report makes the argument that there is much 
to be learned from these asset recovery processes, and in 
particular from first hand involved persons, and that these 
insights can be the basis upon which to consider the po-
tential usefulness of more structured forms of engagement 
between state parties in the form of a guidance (Chapter 6).
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2.1 When and how to initiate a 
dialogue
The UNCAC establishes that stolen assets, once confiscat-
ed, should be returned to their prior legitimate owners. To 
operationalize this principle, the state parties involved in the 
case studies analysed in this report engaged in a dialogue. 
These engagements typically commenced not just after the 
confiscation was confirmed, but already during the initial 
stages of the asset recovery process, i.e. when assets were 
detected and frozen. 
The usefulness of engaging in a dialogue at quite an early 
stage of the asset recovery process has been particularly 
highlighted by interviewees involved in the cases on behalf 
of Peru and the Philippines. In Peru the early engagements 
between the Swiss and Peruvian authorities allowed the 
latter to explain the local case context and express their 
desire to repatriate the assets in the shortest time possible 
and initial thoughts on end-use. In addition, it allowed the 
parties to engage in a discussion on the identification of 
the origin of the funds and establish the manner in which 
these had been transferred from Peru to Switzerland. Hav-
ing the opportunity to meet in person and by cooperating 
with the Swiss authorities, the Peruvian officials were also 
able to engage with the formal procedures of the asset 
recovery process, while at the same time, supporting the 
case for a final restitution process. Besides this, their early 
engagements also provided both parties an opportunity to 
establish a relationship upon which they could build trust 
and develop an agreement on the end-use of assets, which 
was to be to advance national development objectives and 
strengthen the fight against corruption. Interviewees con-
firmed that the trust created through this early engagement 
allowed the parties to jointly identify and pursue the most 
flexible and fast approach to returning the assets to the 
Peruvian authorities. 
As noted above, early engagement between state parties 
also proved useful in the case of the Philippines. Inter-
viewees noted in this context the absence, initially, of a 
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Treaty, which made it nec-
essary to break new grounds for the Philippine authorities 
to commence a dialogue with their Swiss counterparts. It 
was noted that once the Treaty was in place and allowed 
for the parties to engage in a formal dialogue, the process 
was expedited. The treaty was instrumental in providing 
guidance on how collaboration in this process could take 
shape, although this guidance was primarily focused on the 
legal procedures and not related to decision regarding the 
end-use of returned assets. At the same time, interviewees 
remembered that early engagement between state parties 
specifically geared toward discussing the end-use of even-
tually returned assets had been viewed as risky by some, 
as it was feared the defendants could raise accusations of 
collusion or of attempting to influence an on-going legal 
processes. These considerations were also relevant in the 
case of Kazakhstan. 
2.2 Who to engage in a dialogue
In terms of the actors involved in these processes and di-
alogues on the side of requesting states, in the cases an-
alysed these were predominantly the ministries of justice 
and foreign affairs as well as the involved prosecuting and 
judicial authorities and sometimes the lawyers representing 
the requesting countries in the requested states and legal 
proceedings there. In the case of Kazakhstan, the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Kazakh 
Ambassador in the USA and lawyers representing the Ka-
zakh Government in the USA were important actors in the 
process. In the case of the Philippines, it was the Office of 
the Ombudsman and the Departments of Justice and For-
eign Affairs that played a leading role. In the case of Peru 
– according to one interviewee due to the very special polit-
ical situation that existed at the time - the law enforcement 
agencies played a dominant role. In particular the Office of 
the Attorney General and the Judge presiding over the cas-
es had been engaged directly with the Swiss authorities. 
On the side of the requested states, similar organs were 
involved in the dialogue. In the case of Switzerland, it was 
2. Dialogue on asset return 
and end-use
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the typically Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs that took a lead role 
in the processes, while in the United States, the Department 
of Justice usually had a lead role, with inputs from the State 
Department and occasionally other law enforcement agen-
cies and foreign missions. In the case of Kazakhstan, the 
World Bank was included in the discussions, represented 
through the Offices of the President and the Vice President. 
The World Bank was said to have agreed to this role also be-
cause it provided an opportunity to contribute to anti-corrup-
tion activities, which in turn supported its on-going poverty 
alleviation activities in Kazakhstan. This was later formalised 
in the decision of the Southern District Court making the 
involvement of the World Bank legally binding to all state 
parties. Bringing in a third, neutral party into the dialogue 
was considered a desirable strategy to facilitate a dialogue 
between states that do not have a strong history of such 
dialogue or may even be conflicting over other matters. 
Although it might be easy to imagine the various parties 
representing the requesting and requested states at dif-
ferent ends of the table, interviewees stated that these 
dialogues were usually mostly operational and often quite 
collaborative. For instance, in the case of the Philippines, 
the Swiss government provided support on the drafting of 
the procedures of the law that detailed the compensation 
of the victims of human rights abuses under the martial 
law. In other cases too, and despite the asymmetrical na-
ture of the relationship between requesting and requested 
states, early and cooperative engagement was perceived 
as conducive to harnessing the expertise available in the 
requested state in support of the restitution processes to 
the requesting state. This may be particularly helpful when 
the domestic institutions in the requesting state are limited 
in their capacity to handle grand corruption cases. In Peru at 
the time for example, there was very limited infrastructure in 
place to handle asset recovery processes; by way of example 
the country did not yet have a financial investigation unit. In 
this case, this resulted in the provision of a team from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to support Peruvian 
authorities in their domestic investigations and providing a 
direct point of contact within the US Department of Justice. 
2.3 Why engage in a dialogue
As noted earlier, and in particular when such a dialogue is 
started early on in the process of recovering stolen assets, all 
interviewees considered that dialogue between concerned 
states had been beneficial for expediting the process, both 
during the legal proceedings and in the final stages of re-
turning and defining the end-use of returned assets. A key 
factor contributing to this was clearly the fact that time 
allows to build trust, which in turn was key when it came 
to resolving the potentially most sensitive matter, namely 
the modalities for returning and using the returned assets. 
Interviewees stated that by engaging in a dialogue, the par-
ties could establish an initial agreement that guided the en-
suing discussions. They also experienced that the dialogue 
was essential in ensuring that interests of all parties in the 
asset recovery process were understood and could be taken 
into account. For instance, in the case of the Philippines, 
the parties were able to find common ground early on in 
the idea that the recovered assets should be used (amongst 
others) to redress victims of human rights abuses under the 
martial law, and to support agricultural reform. Because of 
this early agreement, assets were returned even before the 
end of the legal process and placed in an escrow account 
pending the fulfilment of a number of modalities established 
by the Swiss Federal Court, such as the passing of legis-
lation in the Philippines that determined that the assets 
would be used to redress human rights victims. This had a 
significant positive impact in the Philippines, akin to what 
was stated by an interviewee from Peru as a key impact of 
asset recovery, namely “(…) a positive moral blow for the 
country and a very clear message to the corrupt that every-
thing possible will be done to deprive them of those assets 
which have been obtained illicitly.” 
It is clear that requesting and requested states each come 
with their own motivations, objectives and interests to the 
discussion, but interestingly interviewees found that often 
they converged more than deferred. One interest that is 
usually always converging is that of moving swiftly. Whereas 
successful return of stolen assets sends a strong message 
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in the requesting state that corruption will not remain un-
punished, it sends an equally strong signal by the request-
ed state that its financial system will not be a conduit for 
illegal assets. The parties can also rally behind a common 
vision that is articulated through the end-use, for exam-
ple redress for victims or support to national development 
which ultimately also highlights the fundamental principle 
of the UNCAC, emphasising that corruption has a corrosive 
effective on societies; undermines democracy, the rule of 
law, violates human rights, distorts markets, erodes qual-
ity of live and allows threats to human security to flourish 
(UNODC, 2004: iii). Indeed the global recognition of these 
fundamental principles in the UNCAC and in subsequent 
international texts is likely to further enhance the conver-
gence of interests in asset return discussions. 
2.4 Key takeaways
• (Early) engagement between concerned states can facil-
itate and potentially expedite the asset recovery process 
including discussions on end-use of returned assets 
• (Early) engagement helps build trust and supports build-
ing a common vision of the ultimate objective of asset 
recovery 
• Requesting states may use the dialogue as an opportu-
nity to harness expertise residing within the requested 
states to facilitate the asset recovery processes
• An MLA treaty can provide guidance for how to engage 
in a dialogue
• While each party has its own motivations and objectives 
when engaging in dialogue, a number of these often 
converge, most notably the interest in a swift return of 
stolen assets and the interest in using the asset return 
to send signals domestically.
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3.1 Safeguarding the sovereignty 
of the requesting state
Dialogue between requesting and requested states on mo-
dalities for returning stolen assets have the potential to 
be contentious, to a large extent due to the fact that both 
parties have legitimate interests at stake. A critical aspect 
that comes up in this debate concerns safeguarding the 
sovereignty of the requesting state. Although it was clear 
that the sovereign right to determine the end-use of the re-
turned assets resides with the requesting state, interviewees 
stated that this issue was more relevant at a political level 
and much less relevant at the operational level. 
Most interviewees stated that while the sovereignty of the 
requesting state was a topic present in the background of 
the political dialogue between the parties, it was not openly 
addressed. The reason for these concerns appearing to be 
less relevant in practice were attested to the fact that mostly 
it was considered a foregone issue once the dialogue had 
started, as starting a dialogue would not have been possible 
without the consent of both states. In the case of the Phil-
ippines, the absence of an MLA Treaty made the request-
ing party proactively reach out to the Swiss government for 
support. The concern was thus more with the absence of 
a legal framework for collaboration than protecting sover-
eignty. In the case of Peru, the issue of return and end-use 
was perceived as an ever-present topic in bilateral discus-
sions between Peru, Switzerland and the United States, as 
such these discussions were not seen under the label of 
sovereignty but under the label of bilateral (and multilateral) 
relations and joint anti-corruption efforts. 
In the case of Peru, the inclusion of an element of a con-
sultative process reaching beyond the state sphere is par-
ticularly interesting. At the recommendation of the United 
States, the Peruvian government conducted a so-called 
“notice and comment” system, through which it publicly an-
nounced and asked for comments on the manner in which 
the returned assets would be utilised. The notice and com-
ment system in Peru was considered valuable in managing 
societal expectations. By bringing in civil society perspec-
tives and participation in these decision-making processes, 
it was possible to harness their support and concerns at 
an early stage. This also served as a strategy to pre-empt 
possible critiques on the content of the chosen modality 
during its implementation stage, while the final decision 
remained in the hands of the government. Peruvian inter-
viewees interpreted this process as a testimony to the ac-
knowledgement that while sovereignty is to be preserved, 
a dialogue-based outcome is likely to be better accepted 
by all concerned parties. 
Thus, our research suggests that while protecting the sov-
ereignty of the requesting state is a critical aspect of asset 
recovery, at the operational level pragmatic considerations 
have proven to be more relevant. An interesting thought was 
raised by one of the interviewees in relation to the case of 
Kazakhstan:   
Sovereignty is more discussed in policy meetings, not so 
much in the discussions on specific cases. Sovereignty is 
only a theoretical issue. Sovereignty anyway resides in the 
people not in the government, so how do you get the money 
back to the people and make sure people have a role in the 
use of the money? That is the bottom line. In that sense, it 
is about ensuring that the actual sovereign – the people – 
can decide and benefit.
3.2 Balancing sovereignty of the 
requesting and requested states
This more pragmatic approach adopted by state parties may 
be facilitated by the wish to pursue specific goals related to 
the asset return process. This was particularly relevant in 
the case of Kazakhstan, where the recovered assets con-
cerned the proceeds of bribery and the desire by the re-
questing state to protect the reputation of the government 
alongside some pressures from foreign parties influenced 
the nature of the dialogue. These dynamics were further 
impacted by the US Southern District Court decision, which 
3. Safeguarding sovereignty
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made a number of stipulations regarding the end-use, such 
as that the funds should not be returned directly to the Ka-
zakh government but be utilised to enhance the social good 
and be disbursed by a third party with involvement of the 
World Bank. The fact that the Court could decide in such 
detail on the return modalities is unique in this case as the 
assets were confiscated in the context of a settlement; as 
such the issue of sovereignty is less at stake under the ap-
plicable international legal frameworks. The level of conces-
sions made in this particular case was higher on the side of 
the Kazakh government, whilst it can be argued that their 
reputational gains may balance this out, as well as the fact 
that ex post evaluations of the project that was eventually 
implemented with the returned assets has benefited the 
Kazakh society considerably. 
The asset return process in the Philippines was also dom-
inated by a pragmatic approach. Here the absence of an 
MLA Treaty and indeed any applicable international legal 
framework made the engagement with the Swiss authori-
ties contingent on the goodwill of the Swiss authorities to 
facilitate these processes and return the assets to the Phil-
ippines. The converging interests described in the previous 
chapter, of the Philippines to receive the assets swiftly, and 
of Switzerland to set a sign against misuse of its financial 
centre, have supported the discussions and allowed to find 
agreement rather quickly. The risk of the returned assets 
being misappropriated again was an important topic during 
the discussions according to one interviewee who stated: 
The Swiss government was concerned that the returned 
assets would be stolen or otherwise used improperly again. 
I think these were reasonable concerns given the level of 
corruption in the Philippines at the time. They were also 
concerned about the developmental and social impact that 
the underlying crime had had on the Philippines, and so was 
my Government. 
Indeed, it was a shared interest of the Philippine and Swiss 
state parties that the assets should be returned swiftly but 
with the joint understanding that it would be critical that 
these funds would not be stolen again. Both parties also 
agreed that the returned assets should be employed to make 
up for some of the above quoted developmental and social 
damages and human rights abuses that resulted from cor-
ruption under the Marcos regime. By framing the concerns 
as such, it was possible for both parties to acknowledge 
(tacitly) the validity of concerns about the integrity of the 
modality for end-use, while taking away the politically sen-
sitive sting of discussing such issues more openly and as a 
judgement or reflection on the capabilities of the Philippine 
government. As such, the primary concern of the Swiss 
government was that a substantial amount of the returned 
funds would be used to compensate the human rights vi-
olations victims of the Marcos regime and a result placed 
two related modalities on the return of recovered funds. 
The acknowledgement by the Philippines that the concerns 
of the Swiss government were reasonable and valid also reso-
nated through in the case of Peru. Here the parties were also 
in agreement over the need for Peru to return what was lost 
while considering the need for ways to disburse the funds 
that would be protected against renewed malpractices. In 
this regard, the explicit political will conveyed by the tran-
sitional government and newly elected government in Peru 
at the time were key factors that expedited this agreement. 
To this end, one interviewee stated: 
It is understandable that states like the United States and 
Switzerland had their doubts that these funds would be well 
invested due to the corruption background of Peru. This sort 
of tension is natural but I would not say that in the Peruvian 
case there really was a conflict because of that. 
This is not to say that agreement was always immediate. 
Peru and the United States for example were said to have 
disagreed on the proposal by the latter to channel a portion 
of the recovered assets to the flight against drug trafficking. 
In the end, such politically sensitive issues were however 
typically overcome by framing them within a pragmatic dis-
course that led to mutually acceptable modalities of engage-
ment and collaboration. From a comparative perspective, 
the concessions made by the concerned states seemed to 
have been more balanced in the cases of the Philippines 
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and Peru, whilst as noted above in the case of Kazakhstan 
a certain imbalance must be observed, partially attested 
to the particular nature of the applied confiscation regime. 
In both Peru and the Philippines, the dialogue was said to 
have been open and collaborative, and interviewees from 
all concerned states stated that the joint wish to expedite 
the asset return resulted in an agreement that was cogni-
sant of the wishes of the requested state while following 
the interests of the requesting state and local context.  An 
interviewee from Peru summarised this pointedly as follows:
In weak countries with corrupt structures entrenched in the 
highest echelons of power something that cannot happen 
is that you make an effort to recover or repatriate all these 
assets and that they return to corruption schemes. Thus, if 
the international community - not of course because of a 
whim or by imposition or other political motivations or oth-
erwise, but based on a healthy concern to see that these 
funds are well invested in favour of the communities of the 
requesting states – suggests that dialogue is a good prac-
tice for determining asset return and end-use, I am totally 
in favour of being able to create a dialogue to reach rea-
sonable and positive agreements.
3.3 Key takeaways
• The dialogue between parties on the modalities for re-
turning stolen assets and their end-use may be influ-
enced by a power imbalance between concerned states, 
though it can indeed be to the advantage of either the 
requesting or requested states, and the power constel-
lation strongly varies from case to case. 
• This power imbalance may give rise to concerns about 
sovereignty, but these concerns are in practice most 
prevalent in political discussions and less so at oper-
ational level where pragmatic considerations prevail.
• Power imbalance and concerns about sovereignty have 
in practice most effectively been overcome by willing-
ness by all concerned parties to acknowledge shared 
objectives in the asset return process. 
• These shared objectives are in turn framed within the 
joint design of modalities for returning and using re-
turned stolen assets. 
• By acknowledging shared interests and using them to 
guide the design of modalities for return and end-use 
of stolen assets, the concerned parties can avoid more 
politically charged discussions which would be deviated 
by power imbalance. 
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4.1 Considerations informing the 
end-use of returned assets
The end-use of returned assets is one of the critical pinna-
cles of the asset recovery process. As such, the government 
of the requesting state closes the corruption loop in that it 
recovers public funds that were illegally misappropriated. To 
ensure that the asset recovery process, which often takes 
many years to complete due to the complex technical and 
legal nature of this process, comes to a truly successful 
end, many interviewees found that assigning the returned 
assets to a particular purpose has important symbolic impli-
cations, many of which have been discussed in earlier sec-
tions. In practice, numerous criteria have been applied to 
determine the particular use for returned assets, and these 
criteria are invariably very context sensitive. Criteria applied 
in the discussed cases include the nature of the underlying 
crime, the impact of the crime (victims) or the identity of the 
perpetrator of the crime, although the case of Kazakhstan 
stands out in this regard as noted later. 
In the case of Peru, the nature of the crime through which 
the assets were misappropriated was the key factor that 
informed the end-use of the return assets. According to 
relevant interviewees, the decision to not dilute the assets 
in the general budget but rather for them to be used for an 
“altruistic” purpose, and specifically to address weaknesses 
in the country’s anti-corruption system, was quickly taken. 
According to interviewees involved in the Peruvian case, 
these ideas were supported by a majority of international 
non-governmental organisations that contacted the con-
cerned states in this regard. 
In the case of the Philippines, the impact of the underlying 
crime was a key consideration informing the decision on the 
end-use of the returned assets, as a result of which it was 
agreed that the returned assets should be used to compen-
sate the victims (of human rights abuses under the martial 
law of former President Marcos which was fuelled by cor-
ruption). In related cases in the Philippines, consideration 
was also given to the peasant farmers who suffered from 
4. Decisions on end-use
the land reforms implemented under the martial law and 
where corruption under Ferdinant Marcos had generated 
a considerable share of the stolen funds. In sum, the main 
concern was to ensure that the money went back to those 
that suffered most under the Marcos regime. 
In the case of Kazakhstan, case related considerations were 
less relevant as the recovered proceeds were the result of 
alleged bribery and the assets were returned as a result of 
a settlement. Instead, it was considered important to utilise 
the funds in such a way that it would address key economic 
and social needs of the Kazak citizens, thereby acknowl-
edging the fact that corruption is internationally recognised 
to harm social and economic development. Indirectly this 
can be seen as a consideration of impact of the underlying 
crime, although less directly than in the case of the Philip-
pines. Interviewees also reiterated that considerations of 
transparency in the utilisation of funds, indirectly a refer-
ence to the underlying crime as per the Peruvian example, 
as well as issues of absorption capacity due to the fact that 
funds were not to be administered by the Government, were 
importantly considered. 
4.2 What modalities for managing 
and protecting returned assets?
Modalities to manage and use returned assets can have 
various designs and are particularly informed by the ob-
jectives of the end-use and characterised by the extent to 
which the government of the requesting state is in control of 
these processes. On the one hand, assets can be returned 
to the government and integrated into the regular budget, 
utilising the ordinary public financial management systems 
to monitor the fund disbursement. In practice this could 
mean fully merging the returned funds into the national 
budget or including it in the national budget but earmarked 
to a particular budget line. A variant on this is what is often 
referred to in dedicated literature as “enhanced country 
system”, in which case additional precautions are expect-
ed to be taken in order make the asset management and 
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disbursement more transparent. Alternatively, arrangements 
could be made for the creation of a dedicated and typically 
autonomous fund with enhanced public reporting and ac-
countability arrangements. Another option is the transfer 
of fund management and disbursement responsibility to a 
third party, such as an international or non-governmental 
organisation. (World Bank 2009: 11) In one case of assets 
that were returned from Switzerland to Angola (not discussed 
in this report), the funds were returned through a program 
implemented by Switzerland’s bilateral aid agency (Swiss 
Agency for Development Cooperation, SDC).
In the case of Kazakhstan, the concerned state parties 
together with the World Bank agreed that the recovered 
assets were to be managed through an autonomous fund 
called the Bota Kazakh Child and Youth Development Foun-
dation (Fenner Zinkernagel & Attisso, 2014: 340). This new 
institution had to be created specifically for facilitating the 
return of the assets due to the fact that no local (non-gov-
ernmental) organisation had been found that seemed to 
have sufficient absorption and implementation capacity, and 
the ruling of the US Southern District Court prohibited the 
return of the funds directly to the Government. Following 
an international procurement processes, the International 
Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) was selected to build 
the structure and capacity of the Bota Foundation. The Bota 
Foundation was staffed primarily with Kazakh citizens and 
overseen by a board of trustees composed of five Kazakh 
citizens and one representative each from Switzerland and 
the USA. The creation of a Foundation dedicated exclusively 
to the return of stolen funds from the US and Switzerland 
allowed to create particular control and oversight functions, 
as a result of which according to interviewees no signifi-
cant incidents of theft or misuse of these funds occurred; 
according to one interviewee only one instance of a (com-
paratively small) misuse of funds was detected and could 
be remedied immediately.
In the Marcos case, the assets were transferred in early 
2004 from Switzerland to an escrow account with the Phil-
ippines National Bank, but were to remain frozen on that 
account until a number of stipulations made by the Swiss 
Federal Court were met. Amongst these were that a third 
of the returned assets were to be used to compensate vic-
tims of human rights violations committed during the mar-
tial law; the remainder was largely to be used for agrarian 
reform, in response to the fact that the agriculture sector 
was thought to have suffered particularly much from cor-
ruption under the Marcos regime. The law establishing this 
arrangement and the ad hoc specialised body that was to 
administer the funds for the purpose of human rights vi-
olation compensation, the Human Rights Victims’ Claims 
Board, was eventually passed in 2013. The 10-year delay 
in passing the law has given rise to great concern among 
the interviewees and outside observers, as the redress for 
human rights victims will in many cases now come too late, 
as stated by one interviewee. Also, a number of allegations 
were made regarding the use of the funds that were to be 
used for agricultural reform, as other reports have described 
(e.g. World Bank 2007). 
In the case of Peru, the assets returned from Switzerland 
and the United States were channelled through a national 
fund (FEDADOI), which however was administered through 
the normal budget with a board of representatives determin-
ing the allocation of the funds. The board was composed of 
representatives of five government agencies, and as part of 
the agreements between returning and requesting states, 
the assets were to be invested in anti-corruption efforts 
(Fenner Zinkernagel & Attisso, 2014: 335-336). Indeed, 
the set-up and implementation of FEDADOI was such that 
an enhanced scrutiny over the destination and end-use of 
funds was possible, including to a degree by civil society, 
and that projects were to be funded that would directly 
benefit the rule of law and the fight against corruption. In 
addition, the concerned funds would undergo the standard 
controls implemented by the Peruvian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance as part of the country’s public financial man-
agement system. Interviewees from Peru have admitted 
that some of the projects funded through this arrangement 
were potentially questionable, and that the involvement of 
the heads of potential beneficiary agencies in the decision 
making over the use of funds could have been perceived 
as a conflict of interest. 
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4.3 Key takeaways
• The end-use of returned funds has in practice typically 
been linked to the origin of the assets, and notably to 
either the nature of the underlying crime, the impact of 
the underlying crime, or the nature of the perpetrator(s) 
of the underlying crime. 
• Irrespective of which of these options is chosen, link-
ing the end-use to an aspect of the origin of the stolen 
crimes is considered to have great symbolic meaning, 
as it is a way to make up for the damages caused by 
the underlying crime and/or to show resolve against 
the underlying crime.
• The objective of the end-use of returned assets informed 
the modalities through which these assets would be 
managed. 
• Various designs have in the past been used to manage 
and protect the returned assets, with varying degree of 
government influence in the administration of the fund, 
and varying degree of success in protecting the returned 
funds from further misuse.
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5.1 Returning assets for 
the benefit of requesting 
governments and their citizens
The different modalities adopted for the end-use of returned 
assets in the country case studies were well considerate 
of the political context of implementation and, as noted in 
the previous section, focused primarily on efforts to either 
compensate for damages caused by the underlying crime 
or working towards reducing and preventing such crimes 
from occurring again. From an anti-corruption perspective, 
in which asset recovery is deeply enshrined, and from the 
perspective of development, of which anti-corruption is an 
important component, these returns can therefore be con-
sidered a success. However, and despite the comprehen-
sive discussions that preceded the various modalities, the 
implementation has been quite challenging and outcomes 
limited at times. This section attempts to take stock of 
these past experiences with a particular focus on some of 
the weaknesses and failures of the utilised arrangements, 
not in order to discredit the largely positive outcome but 
rather to ensure that future end-use designs may benefit 
and become more effective based on this experience. 
When considering the case of Kazakhstan, a quite com-
prehensive autonomous foundation was set-up to disburse 
the recovered assets. Of all the different modalities that 
could have been considered, this arrangement had the least 
amount of government influence. This being said, although 
on paper the influence of the government was limited, many 
of the projects would not have been implemented without 
the assistance and tacit support of the government. This 
resulted in a positive outcome in that at least one of the 
project components was later considered for adoption into 
general government policy, but implementation did suffer oc-
casionally from the limited interaction with and thus support 
from the Government. Another point to consider was that 
the Foundation had a fairly comprehensive governance and 
oversight structure. According to subsequent evaluations of 
the project, this was instrumental in preventing misuse of 
funds. Interviewees however stated that the arrangement 
5. Outcomes of returning  
stolen assets 
had been criticised because around 10% of the returned 
funds were used for the administration of the project. It 
would appear however that when compared to regular over-
head rates applied to technical assistance projects, this is 
an acceptable cost and adequate in light of the benefits of 
having successfully safeguarded the project from a consid-
erably high risk of re-misappropriation of the funds. 
As a takeaway from the Kazakhstan experience, one could 
imagine that the sustainability of the outcomes would have 
possibly been stronger if a local organisation had been found 
with sufficient absorption and implementation capacity or, 
in the absence of such a capable organisation, if the proj-
ect had teamed up with an emerging local organisation to 
carry forward the work after the funds had been used up. 
Moreover, interviewees were of the opinion that although 
the projects chosen for financing with the returned assets 
were of great significance to the concerned population, 
utilising at least some of the returned assets to support an-
ti-corruption and anti-money laundering efforts would have 
had an even greater symbolic effect and long-term impact. 
The importance of giving due consideration to the modality 
chosen is also exemplified in the case of the Philippines. 
Although the recovered assets were returned to the trea-
sury and an escrow account, respectively, disbursing the 
funds has taken significant delays. The design of the end-
use was thoughtful and meaningful as it reflected strongly 
on the causes that have led to the funds being stolen in the 
first place, but operationalizing the mechanism proved to be 
complex. There continues to be disagreement in the Philip-
pines’ parliament on the manner in which the funds should 
be disbursed and the manner in which legitimate claims by 
victims should be identified; these matters were never really 
clearly defined during the discussions on return and end-use. 
Of course the provision for parliamentary scrutiny is to be 
viewed positively as it may allow for adequate monitoring; 
this may compensate to a point for the lack of involvement 
of civil society groups, despite the presence of a strong 
and vocal civil society in the country. However, debate and 
potentially politically motivated and interest driven contest 
over the manner in which the assets should be disbursed 
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has created serious bottlenecks to the effective implemen-
tation. Interviewees stated also that there were numerous 
concerns raised regarding corruption in the procedure as 
a result of gaps in the latter. As put forward by one of the 
interviewees from the Philippines: 
Hence, the devil is in the details. In theory, the way the 
end-use was designed for the returned funds stolen by 
former President Marcos was meaningful and good, but 
the practical implementation posed major problems and 
continues to do so, which may easily result in the purpose 
being largely defeated. 
A different set of challenges arose in Peru where the param-
eters and management of the fund were well designed and 
had a clear symbolic significance, conveying a sincere wish 
of the government to seek to prevent future such crimes 
from occurring. This was described by one of the interview-
ees from Peru as follows: 
It was significant in terms of the message and the destina-
tion. It had a positive impact on recipients whom it seems 
to me were well chosen as priorities by the state.
To this end, an initial list of beneficiaries was developed 
which determined how FEDADOI would disburse the funds. 
However, challenges arose when the power struggle over 
access to these funds erupted in the context of political 
changes. In one instance, a new Minister introduced changes 
to the rules governing how FEDADOI funds were to be used. 
When a new government took power, further changes were 
made that attracted criticism from civil society and other 
stakeholders. The lesson to be learned from this example 
is that it is important to consider the political context in 
which modalities are implemented and, more importantly, 
how a change in this context could influence the end-use 
of the agreed modality. The case of Peru shows well how 
even only small and incremental changes diluted the initial 
purpose and meaning of the fund, which ultimately created 
a situation in which it was possible to use the fund to cover 
current government expenses rather than for the objectives 
defined in the asset return discussions. 
The cases of Peru and the Philippines showed how a well 
thought through mechanism for use of the recovered assets 
can run into difficulties during operationalization. Consider-
ing these two challenges, interviewees from both countries 
considered that an alternative arrangement could have been 
to manage the recovered assets within a completely inde-
pendent fund and to entrust the administration of the fund 
to a neutral third party, or to place stricter requirements on 
the utilisation of the recovered assets. As an interviewee 
from the Philippines stated:
Perhaps a completely independent fund could have prevent-
ed some of these problems, but this would have also been 
an admission on the side of the requesting and requested 
government that there is a lack of good faith in the admin-
istration. It is for this reason that both the requesting and 
requested states need to be honest about corruption con-
cerns and capacity constraints. Otherwise, the returned 
assets will be badly invested due to bad management or 
even lost to corruption again. 
This indicates that there is some kind of trade off involved 
in the manner in which the dialogue between the request-
ing and requested states ensues and the subsequent oper-
ationalization of the modality designed for the end-use of 
recovered assets. Indeed, the issue of trust and showing 
good faith in the engagements between the state parties 
has an important symbolic meaning to support progress in 
the discussions. However, more critical scrutiny regarding 
the precise nature of modalities and possible challenges 
that may arise in their implementation also need to be tak-
en seriously, and should not be sacrificed for the benefit of 
a swift or over-harmonious dialogue. At the end of the day, 
detailing the various safeguards to ensure an effective util-
isation of the returned assets is in the interest of both par-
ties. Furthermore, by framing these issues within a context 
where general guidance to the discussion around return and 
end-use is available, state parties would possibly be able to 
better balance the more delicate relational aspects of the 
process and at the same time be cognisant of the need to 
establish appropriate modalities to govern the end-use of 
returned assets.
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Although the different modalities for asset return have en-
countered various challenges, it is clear that none of the 
associated benefits would have been sustained should the 
money had gone back without making provisions for its 
end-use. Beyond the risk of losing the returned assets again 
through corrupt vehicles or alternatively, absorbing the funds 
within the general budget, the effort of returning assets 
would have also missed out on its potential symbolic impact 
and political message. This political message associated with 
the return of assets could be considered as important as the 
monetary value associated with the recovered assets itself. 
5.2 Key takeaways
• The implementation of the different modalities adopted 
for the end-use of returned assets in the cases stud-
ied has had considerable impact in terms of furthering 
development, preventing corruption or rectifying harm 
done by the underlying crime, but their implementation 
has met several challenges. 
• Consideration should be given to the feasibility of the 
end-use mechanism, as exemplified by the challenges 
faced in the Philippines with the human rights compen-
sation scheme. 
• Consideration should be given to the sustainability of 
any social and economic impact that end-use schemes 
are intended to have.
• A thorough operationalization of the design needs to con-
sider the local political context, including how a change 
in that context could affect the end-use.
• (Independent) monitoring facilities may assist in manag-
ing these processes and simultaneously act as a risk-mit-
igating strategy.
• Dialogue between requesting and requested states can 
provide a framework in support of developing effective 
and efficient modalities governing the end-use of re-
turned assets; challenges that may occur in this dialogue 
should not prevent a careful reflection on feasibility and 
details of end-use implementation mechanisms.
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6. Considerations for a 
guidance on asset return
6.1 Functionality of further 
guidance
Guidance developed by and for both requesting and request-
ed states must first and foremost confirm the fundamental 
principles of returning stolen assets and the sovereignty of 
concerned states. Its main contribution, however, would 
be in reducing unnecessary politicisation of the debate by 
anchoring the discussion for large parts at the operational 
level. As such, the debate can be geared toward the ob-
jectives over which states in the past have typically found 
consensus, namely: that assets should be returned swiftly; 
that they should be used to advance a public good; and 
that the sovereign rights of the requesting state must be 
respected whilst the investments made by requested state 
must equally be recognised.  A potential power imbalance, 
which in any event is not always to the disadvantage of the 
same side as noted earlier, can be contained if the discus-
sion is framed in a neutral mediation tool, such as a guid-
ance note, which allows parties to address their respective 
concerns in a constructive manner. 
A guidance note may also support the institutionalisation of 
good practices regarding structured engagements between 
state parties and reflections regarding feasible and mean-
ingful mechanisms for end-use and factors that could be 
considered in identifying shared objectives and determining 
such end-use, as such making a repeated discussion of the 
political aspects of the debate in each case increasingly 
unnecessary. The bottom line is that these are highly com-
plicated and delicate processes. The purpose of a guidance 
note is not to disguise these or pretend that everything can 
be managed at a purely technical level. But by relying on an 
internationally accepted guidance, state parties can pursue 
their interests by reflecting on previous experiences with 
asset recovery processes that are systemised in various 
considerations and parameters. 
6.2 Parameters for further 
guidance
As the cases studied in this report have clearly shown that 
there is no one single best practice when it comes to the 
return and end-use of stolen assets. It is therefore import-
ant that any attempt to develop guidance does not seek 
to reflect a prescriptive agenda but instead offers a set of 
parameters to consider when determining end-use of re-
turned assets, over which concerned states can align their 
interests and objectives and ensure that local and case 
related context is taken into account. In this regard, and 
drawing from the experiences recounted in this report, the 
following matters would appear to be worth including for 
consideration in a guidance: 
Define stakeholder composition:
• Which stakeholder(s) should be involved in the deter-
mination of these objectives in the requesting state? 
Which agency/ies will lead the discussions on behalf 
of the requested states? Defining this from the begin-
ning will greatly enhance communication and efficiency. 
• Would involving a third party (e.g. international organi-
sations, independent expert(s), civil society) be useful 
to act as facilitator for the dialogue on end-use?
Define objective(s) of end-use, e.g.: 
• Redress victims (specific groups of citizens or institu-
tions, or the society at large, a particular sector, a par-
ticular region, etc.); 
• Deal with the root cause(s) of the crime(s) that led to 
the dissipation of the assets, e.g. by strengthening na-
tional anti-corruption efforts or institutions or policies;
• Broader developmental goals as per the requesting 
state’s national development plan which are potentially 
unrelated to the case at hand;
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Operationalisation of asset return modality:
• Absorption capacity (often depending on the amount of 
assets concerned)
• Role of executive power, other government entities (in-
cluding autonomous bodies), civil society or other third 
parties in the implementation
• Definition of a detailed implementation plan
• Likelihood and potential impact of changes in the polit-
ical context on implementation
Monitoring and accountability:
• What type of accountability mechanism could be con-
sidered adequate in relation to amount involved and risk 
patterns identified?
• What accountability mechanisms exist that could satisfy 
this need within the requesting state?
• Is it advisable and desirable to provide for enhanced 
scrutiny over the use of returned (formerly stolen) funds?
• What is the role of international, national and societal 
monitors (i.e. parliament, civil society, international ac-
tors), if any?
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Annex II Interview questions
1. Introductory question
1.1  What was your position and role in the dialogue leading to the decision making process on asset return and their 
end-use?
2. Engaging in a dialogue on asset return
2.1 At which point of the restitution process did your country consider engaging in a dialogue on asset return? 
• What were the main motivations to engage in the dialogue? 
3. Actors involved in the dialogue on asset return 
3.1 Who were the key actors and what was their position or role in the dialogue on the side of your country? 
3.2 Which other actors or partners played an important role in this process? 
3.3 How did such partners become engaged? 
4. Dialogue on end-use of returned assets
4.1 Were there are any concerns about safeguarding the sovereignty of the receiving country? If so, how were these 
taken into account during the dialogue? 
• Was there an open discussion about such concerns?
4.2 Which particular concerns were raised by the requested states? How were these taken into account during the 
dialogue? 
4.3 What was the primary interest of the requested state in the dialogue in your opinion?
• Was there an open discussion about these interests?
4.4 How did the key considerations in the scope of the dialogue change over time? What were the reasons for this? 
• What were the most important concessions made by each party?
4.5 How do you see the balance arising out of the concessions made by the parties? 
4.6 Which significant exogenous factors influenced the dialogue? 
• Did other bilateral topics influence the dialogue? If so, how? 
• Was reference made (explicitly or implicitly) to another dossier of asset return? If so, could you explain on 
how this occurred?
4.7 What were the most important considerations that ultimately led to the choice of this particular end-use of the 
returned assets? 
• Identity of the victims resulting from the crime 
• Characteristics of the perpetrator 
• The networks associated with illicitly obtaining public funds were still in power 
• Nature of the crime associated with the recovered funds 
• Amount of money involved
• National development priorities
• Concerns about the performance of the public financial management system
4.8 Were these discussions held in a private multilateral or bilateral setting or discussed in public settings (such as 
Parliament). 
4.9 How did you manage expectations both internally and externally? 
• Were there any arguments appealing not to engage in this particular choice of end-use of the funds?
• Which office or actor did they come from? 
• How were these concerns countered or dealt with?
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5. End-use of returned assets
5.1 Which different options of end-use were contemplated and what were the decisive criteria for the particular 
choice made? 
5.2 How was the decision made on who would be in charge of implementing the chosen modality of end-use?
6. Implementation of agreed modality for the end-use of returned assets 
6.1 Which were the main challenges encountered during the implementation of the modality associated with the 
end-use of the returned assets?
6.2 Which were the main challenges in the process of monitoring the correct execution of the end-use of the retuned 
assets? 
• How and for how long did the monitoring take place? 
• Was there a follow-up? 
7. Outcomes of the agreed modality for the end-use of returned assets 
7.1 In hindsight, do you think that the chosen modality for the end-use of returned assets has been meaningful? If 
so, could you please give examples of this?
7.2 Alternatively, do you believe there could have been a different and better approach taken? If so, could you please 
give examples of how an alternative approach would have been more appropriate?
7.3 In your opinion, what would have been the impact should the assets have been returned directly into the treasury? 
8. Policy implications 
8.1 Do you believe that the development of guiding principles on dialogues for the return and end-use of returned 
assets would be helpful? (or would have been helpful to you?)
8.2 In your opinion, what would be the key parameters that such guiding principles should take into account?
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Abstract
This working paper presents findings from a research project that sought to better under-
stand decision-making processes on the return of illegally obtained assets using the exam-
ples of past cases of returning assets that had been stolen from Kazakhstan, Peru and the 
Philippines. While previous papers on the subject of returning stolen assets and end-use of 
returned assets were based on third party and desk research, the research feeding into this 
working paper is based on first-hand accounts collected through semi-structured interviews 
with key decision makers involved in these cases in the concerned states.
The key objective of the research was to better understand the motivations, considerations 
and processes that led to the decisions on how and for what purpose to use returned assets. 
In this context, the report in particular looks at a question often debated in asset recovery 
circles, namely whether there may be a power imbalance between requesting and request-
ed states in these processes despite the fact that requesting states are legally empowered 
through the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The potential existence of such a 
power imbalance has in the past often given rise to concern, as it is perceived to potentially 
compromise the fundamental principles of asset return of UNCAC and the sovereignty of the 
concerned states.
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